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Résumé:  Nous étudions le modèle spatial de différentiation d'Hotelling, mais au lieu de 
supposer que le marché est couvert quelles que soient les localisations des 
deux firmes, nous supposons qu'il existe une distance maximale 
(éventuellement infinie) qu'un consommateur est prêt à parcourir pour acheter 
le bien. Cette généralisation apparemment anodine des hypothèses d'Hotelling 
modifie complètement les résultats : le principe de "différentiation minimale" 
d'Hotelling n'est plus vérifié en général. A l'équilibre, les firmes s'engagent 
dans un processus de différentiation maximale, intermédiaire ou minimale, 
selon la forme de la distribution des positions des consommateurs et cette 
distance critique qu'un consommateur est prêt à parcourir pour acquérir le 
bien.  
 
Abstract:  This paper studies Hotelling's spatial competition between two firms, but 
rather than assuming that consumers are ready to buy the good whatever the 
locations of the firms are, it is assumed here that there is an upper limit 
(possibly infinite) to the distance a consumer is ready to cover to buy the 
good. Under this slight generalization of Hotelling's assumptions, Hotelling's 
``minimal differentiation principle'' does not hold in general. At equilibrium, 
firms choose ``minimal'', ``intermediate'' or ``complete'' differentiation, 
depending on this critical distance a consumer is ready to cover and on the 
shape of the distribution of consumers' locations. 
 
Mots clés :  modèle de compétition spatiale d'Hotelling, différentiation des produits 
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81I n t r o d u c t i o n
Product diﬀerentiation is a central issue in Industrial Organization. A large
number of studies on this topic build on Hotelling’s seminal model of location
or spatial-diﬀerentiation (See Hotelling 1929).
In Hotelling’s location model, consumers are located at diﬀerent places on a
line. Two ﬁrms — selling the same product at the same price — simultaneously
choose a location on this line. Consumers are ready to buy one unit — and only
one unit — of the good and they pay transportation costs when going and pur-
chasing the good. Hotelling’s “miminal diﬀerentiation principle” (1929) states
that at Nash equilibrium, both ﬁrms choose the “median consumer” location
(i.e. the location such that one half of the consumers lay at his left-hand side,
and one half of the consumers lay at his right-hand side) — hence the name of
“miminal diﬀerentiation principle” given to Hotelling’s result.
D’Aspremont et al. (1979) challenge this convergence result, arguing that
the assumption that both ﬁrms sell at the same price can not be derived as
an equilibrium result, if sellers are not far enough one from the other. More
speciﬁcally, if ﬁrms simultaneously choose their locations in a ﬁrst stage, and
then, once locations are observed, simulteously choose the price at which they
sell the good, then no price equilibrium exists, when both sellers are locatted
exactly at the same place — as is the case in Hotelling’s result. They provide
an example of a slightly modiﬁed version of Hotelling’s framework (explicitly
introducing prices together with transportation costs in consumers’ preferences),
in which this two-stage game between the ﬁrms always have an equilibrium.
They show in that example than “maximum diﬀerentiation” can be observed
between ﬁrms, ﬁrms choosing to locate at the two ends of the line1.T h i s
two-stage model where ﬁrms choose products ﬁrst and price second oﬀers the
standard explanation in Industrial organization as to why ”ﬁrms generally do not
want to locate at the same place in the product space. The reason is simply the
Bertrand paradoxe: Two ﬁrms producing perfect substitutes face unbridled price
competition (at least in a static framework). In contrast, product diﬀerentiation
establishes clienteles (”market niches”, in the business terminology) and allows
ﬁrms to enjoy some market power over these clienteles. Thus, ﬁrms usually wish
to diﬀerentiate themselves from other ﬁrms” (Tirole 1997, p. 278).
In the present paper, Hotelling’s convergence result will also be challenged,
but on diﬀerent grounds. Softening of price competition is not the only force
which may drive ﬁrms to diﬀerentiate. Indeed, even with no price competition,
it will be shown that ﬁrms may choose to diﬀerentiate. I will keep Hotelling’s
assumption that both ﬁrms sell the product at the same price, whatever their
locations are. As d’Aspremont et al. (1979) have shown, this assumption can
not be supported as an equilibrium result. Rather I simply take the view that
prices are imposed upon the ﬁrms; for legal or technical reasons, price is not
a free parameter in the competition.2. I rather alter another assumption in
1See also Osborne and Pitchik (1987) for further discussion on Hotelling’s result in a two-
stage game.





































8Hotelling’s model: namely that the market is always covered. In Hotelling’s
model, consumers are ready to buy one unit of the good, whatever the location
of the ﬁrms are. I assume instead that if both ﬁrms are too far away from
his location, a consumer prefers not buying the good, rather than paying the
transportation costs. All consumers equally value the good, and choose to buy
the good only if the transportation costs do not exceed the valuation of the good.
Of course I keep the assumption that when both ﬁrms are within “acceptable
distance”, the consumer selects the ﬁrms which is the closest. I only add the
restriction that there is an upper limit to the distance a consumer is ready
to cover to buy the good. This distance will characterize the width of the
“attraction zone” of the ﬁrms.
This may seem an innocuous restriction, and yet, as will be shown below,
it dramatically alters Hotelling’s result. The convergence result may not hold
anymore, and one may observe some “intermediate diﬀerentiation principle”
or ”maximal diﬀerentiation priciple”. The intuition supporting this result is
the following. All through this paper, a normal distribution of consumers’s
locations is assumed. Were a ﬁrm alone on the market, it would select the
modal position, where the larger number of consumers are located, according to
a ”Be where the demand is” principle. Now, in the two-ﬁrm competition, the
convergence to the modal position may not be observed.3 Indeed, suppose that
a ﬁrm has chosen the modal position. In that case, if its opponent also selects
this central position, they will share exactly the same attraction zone and thus
each will attract one half one the consumers who are located within acceptable
distance of the central position. The latter ﬁrm may fare better in that case by
avoiding complete competition, and prefer moving somewhat to the left or the
right. In doing so, it will move from the modal position — thus move away from
the situation where the concentration of consumers is the highest — but on the
other hand, it will avoid splitting in half the number of potential consumers.
We expect the incentives to move away to be greater when the distribution is
ﬂatter (less concentration in the modal position) and when the width of the
attraction zone is larger. It will be shown to be the case indeed. Depending of
the size of the width of the attraction zone compared to the standard deviation
of the distribution of consumers’ location, we can observe convergence in the
central position, intermediate diﬀerentiation, or complete diﬀerentation (in the
sense that no consumer is located at equilibrium within acceptable distance of
both ﬁrms). In particular, some necessary and suﬃcient conditions on this ratio
are provided for the convergence result to hold.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in more details
in section 2. Section 3 presents the ﬁrms’ best responses. Section 4 describes
the best response sets and section 5 characterizes all Nash equilibria in which
of price competition is limited. For instance, the prices of airline tickets in the United States
(before deregulation) where determined exogenously, as the price of gas and books in France
once were” (p. 287).
3Note that contrary to what happened in Hotelling’s setting, we expect here a “modal
consumer” theorem to hold rether than a “median consumer” theorem. Since the distribution





































8ﬁrms play pure strategies. Section 6 brieﬂy concludes The proofs are relegated
in an appendix in section 7. [Note to the referee : In the present version of the
paper, exhaustive proofs are provided. Since several parts of the proofs rely on
similar arguments or calculus, some of them might be ommitted in a published
version of the paper.]
2 The model
Two ﬁrms, labelled A and B, sell the same good at the same price, and choose
location on the real line where consumers are distributed. Consumer loca-
tions are assumed to have a normal distribution, with mean zero and stan-
dard deviation σ. The consumers have unit demand; i.e. each consumer
can either buy one unit of the good (from either ﬁrm), or abstain from buy-
ing. We assume quadratic transportation costs: when a consumer located at
t goes to a ﬁrm located atn b t, he pays a transportation cost c(t,b t)=−(t − b t)2.
All consumers derive the same net intrinsic positive utility δ
2 from bying the
good. If a consumer located at t goes to a ﬁrm located at b t and buy the good,
he gets the total utility δ
2 −(t−b t)2. If he does not buy the good and incurs no
transporation costs, he gets the utility zero.
Suppose ﬁrm A chooses location tA,a n dﬁrm B chooses location tB.W h e n
f a c i n gt h ec o u p l eo fl o c a t i o n(tA,t B), a consumer located at t has three op-
tions: buy the good from ﬁrm A,b u yt h eg o o df r o mﬁrm B,o ra b s t a i nf r o m
buying. Given the assumption on preferences made above, four cases are to be
dostinguished.
Case 1:
¯ ¯tA − t
¯ ¯ ≤ δ and
¯ ¯tB − t
¯ ¯ ≤ δ,b o t hﬁrms are within acceptable
distance4, meaning that he prefers buying the good from either ﬁrm rather
than not consuming the good. In that case, he buys the good from the closest
ﬁrm, just as in Hotelling’s model. If
¯ ¯tA − t
¯ ¯ <
¯ ¯tB − t
¯ ¯, he buys the good from
ﬁrm A;i f
¯ ¯tA − t
¯ ¯ >
¯ ¯tB − t
¯ ¯, he buys the good from ﬁrm B;i f
¯ ¯tA − t
¯ ¯ =
¯ ¯tB − t
¯ ¯
he is indiﬀerent between buying from ﬁrm A and buying from ﬁrm B,a n dw e
assume that in that case he chooses both ﬁrms with equal probability 1/2.
Case 2:
¯ ¯tA − t
¯ ¯ ≤ δ and
¯ ¯tB − t
¯ ¯ > δ,o n l yﬁrm A is within acceptable
distance. In that case he buys the good from ﬁrm A.
Case 3:
¯ ¯tA − t
¯ ¯ > δ and
¯ ¯tB − t
¯ ¯ ≤ δ,o n l yﬁrm B is within acceptable
distance. In that case he buys the good from ﬁrm B.
Case 4:
¯ ¯tA − t
¯ ¯ > δ and
¯ ¯tB − t
¯ ¯ > δ,b o t hﬁrms are beyond acceptable
distance. In that case, the consumer rather abstains and does not buy the
good.
Note that when δ → +∞, we are in the standard Hotelling’s situation:
consumers consume one unit of the good whatever the location of the ﬁrms are,
and buy from the closest ﬁrm.
4When a consumer is indiﬀerent between buying and nor bying the good, we make the
assumption that he does buy it. This assumption plays no role in solving the game for the





































8The ﬁrms meet any demand they face. The objective of the ﬁr m si st os e l l
as many units of good as they can. Given the behavior of consumers described
above, payoﬀ functions for the ﬁrms are easily derived; they are explicitly pre-
sented in the next section.
3F i r m s ’ p a y o ﬀ functions
Let us denote by GB ¡
t;tA¢
the payoﬀ obtained by ﬁrm B when choosing lo-
cation t, against location tA by ﬁrm A,a n dGA ¡
t;tB¢
the payoﬀ of ﬁrm A
when choosing location t, against location tB by ﬁrm B.W en o wd e r i v eac l o s e
form expression for teh payoﬀ function GB ¡
.;tA¢
. The expression of the payoﬀ
functions depends on whether the attraction zones of the two ﬁrms intersect or
not.
When the two attraction zones do not intersect, that is, when
¯ ¯tA − t
¯ ¯ > 2δ,
ﬁrm B attracts all consumers that are located in its attraction zone. These are
all consumers whose location belongs to the interval [t − δ,t+ δ].I nt h a tc a s e ,
the payoﬀ of ﬁrm B is F(t + δ) − F(t − δ),w h e r eF is the cumulative function
of the normal distribution with mean zero and standard deviation σ.
When the attraction zones do intersect, that is, when
¯ ¯tA − t
¯ ¯ ≤ 2δ,c o n -
sumers who are located in the intersection will choose the ﬁrm which is closest
to their own location. The explicit expression for the payoﬀ function GB ¡
t;tA¢














when t = tA,t h et w oﬁrms share the consumers located in the interval
£
tB − δ,t B + δ
¤





F(tA + δ)) − F(tA − δ)
¤
.N o t et h a tGB ¡
t;tA¢
as a function of t is continuous in tA −2δ and tA +2δ, but that in general, it is
not continuous in tA. Lemma 1 and remark 1 below sum up the results so far.
Lemma 1
If t ≤ tA − 2δ,G B ¡
t;tA¢
= F(t + δ) − F(t − δ),






)) − F(t − δ),





F(tA + δ)) − F(tA − δ)
¤
,
If tA <t≤ tA +2 δ,G B ¡
t;tA¢





If t ≥ tA +2 δ,G B ¡
t;tA¢
= F(t + δ) − F(t − δ).
As noted above, GB ¡
t;tA¢
as a function of t is in general not continuous in




as a function of t is not continuous in tA,e x c e p tf o rtA =0 :
when tA < 0, lim
t→tA
t<tA
















































GB(t;tA)=1 /2[F(δ) − F(−δ)],
when tA > 0, lim
t→tA
t<tA




Indeed, when tA < 0, lim
t→tA
t<tA
















F(tA) − F(tA − δ)
¤
} which is strictly negative
when tA < 0. Similar arguments are used in the other cases.
4 Description of the best responses
Given the symmetry between ﬁrms, we only need to characterize the best re-
sponses for ﬁrm B. Let us denote by BRB(t) the set of best responses of ﬁrm
B against location t by ﬁrm A.
Note ﬁr s tt h a ti ti ss u ﬃcient to describe the best responses against t ≤ 0,
since best responses against t ≥ 0 can then be very easily derived. Indeed,
given the symmetry of the distribution of consumers’ locations, for any t ≥ 0,
x ∈ BRB(t) if and only if −x ∈ BRB(−t).
Proposition 1 characterizes the set of best responses against any value of
t ≤ 0. Three cases are to be considered.
Proposition 1
Case 1. If δ
2/σ2 ≤ 1
4 ln(2),
if t ≤− 2δ,B R B (t)={0}
if −2δ ≤ t<0,B R B (t)={t +2 δ}
if t =0 ,B R B(t)={2δ,−2δ}
Case 2. If 1
4 ln(2) < δ
2/σ2 < 2ln(2),
if t ≤− 2δ,B R B (t)={0}
if −2δ ≤ t ≤− a, BRB (t)={t +2 δ}
if −a ≤ t<0,B R B(t)={t2(t)}
if t =0 ,B R B(t)={t2(0),−t2(0)}
Case 3. If δ
2/σ2 ≥ 2ln(2),
if t ≤− 2δ,B R B (t)={0}
if −2δ ≤ t ≤− a, BRB (t)={t +2 δ}
if −a ≤ t<−b, BRB(t)={t2(t)}
if −b ≤ t<0,B R B(t)=∅5
if t =0 ,B R B(t)={0}













































2 − 2σ2 ln(2)
2δ
,( 2 )





t − 4δ +2
q
(t − δ)
2 +6 σ2 ln(2)
¶
. (3)
The proof of proposition 1 is provided in the appendix in sub-section 7.1.
Before commenting on the results stated in proposition 1, remark 2 describes
some of the properties of the function t2.
Remark 2. Properties of the function t2
Elementary calculus shows that the function t2 satisﬁes the properties summed
up in the table below6:











2(t) −2/3 % 0 % +2/3
t00
2(t) +
Besides, t2(−a)=−a +2 δ, t2(−b)=−b.
Therefore the monotonicity of t2 on the interval [−a,0] depends on the rel-
ative positions of δ −
p
2σ2 ln(2), a,a n d0, and thus on the ratio δ
2/σ2.
Case 2a. When 1/4ln(2)< δ
2/σ2 ≤ 1/2ln(2),t 2 is increasing on [−a,0].
Case 2b.When 1/2ln(2)≤ δ













2/σ2 ≥ 2ln(2), t2 is decreasing on [−a,0].
Note also that in all cases ∀t ∈ ]−a,0],t 2(t) <t+2 δ (indeed, t2(−a)=
−a+2δ and for t ∈ [−a,0],t 0
2(t) < 1). Besides, in cases 2a and 2b, ∀t ∈ [−a,0],
t2(t) > 0.
Comments on Proposition 1.














Note also that δ2/σ2 ≤ 1/2ln(2)⇐⇒ δ −
p
2σ2 ln(2) ≤− a; and
δ2/σ2 ≥ 2ln(2)⇐⇒ δ −
p





































8Case 1. These are situations where the width of the attraction zone (δ)
is small compared to the standard deviation of the distribution of consumers
location (σ).
In that case, ﬁrm B always avoids direct confrontation with ﬁrm A :t h et w o
attraction zones do not intersect. We will use the term of ”maximal diﬀerentia-
tion” to describe such situations, where positions of teh ﬁrm are at distance 2δ
one from the other.
If ﬁrm A is far away enough from the center (t ≤− 2δ), then ﬁrm’s B best
response is to locate at the modal central position, where it gets the maximal
possible payoﬀ.
If ﬁrm A chooses a location within 2δ of the central location, the best ﬁrm
B can do is still to avoid direct confrontation and not to intersect its attraction
zone ; in that case, ﬁrm B chooses t +2δ, which is, among all location such that
the two attraction zones do not intersect, that which is closest to the central
location.
Case 2. These are intermediate situations as to the width of the attrac-
tion zone compared to the standard deviation of the distribution of consumers
location.
In that case, ﬁrm B avoids direct confrontation with ﬁrm A only when ﬁrm
A is far enough from the central location (t ≤ a).
When ﬁrm A is within distance a of the central location it becomes most
proﬁtable to seek direct confrontation, and have the two attraction zones par-
tially intersect.7
In all these situations, the best response for ﬁrm B is always to choose a
location such that the two ﬁrms are on opposite sides, relative to the central
position.
Case 3. These are situations where the width of the attraction zone is large
compared to the standard deviation of the distribution of consumers location.
As in case 2, ﬁrm B avoids direct confrontation with ﬁrm A only when ﬁrm
A is far enough from the central location (t ≤− a).
When ﬁrm A chooses some intermediate location (−a ≤ t ≤− b), it becomes
most proﬁtable to seek partial confrontation, and have the two attraction zones
partially intersect. In that case, since the function t2 is decreasing on the
interval [−a,−b] (see remark 2), ﬁrm B moves to the left hand side as ﬁrm A
moves to the right towards the central position. Confrontation gets ﬁercer as
ﬁrm A moves towards the central location.
If ﬁrm A is close enough to the center (has a location within b of the central
location but still diﬀerent from the center), there is no best response for ﬁrm
B. Ideally, ﬁrm B would like to seek almost complete confrontation, that is to
stick to ﬁrm A, but slightly on the right hand side. Ideally, ﬁrm B would like
to choose position t + ε,w i t hε > 0 as small as possible.
7Indeed, in that case, ﬁrm B chooses t2(t) <t+2δ (see Remark 2) in response to ﬁrm A’s





































8When ﬁrm A chooses the central location, the best ﬁrm B c a nd oi st os e l e c t
this central location as well, facing in that case complete confrontation, in the
sense that the attraction zones of the two ﬁrms exactly coincide.
Note that when δ goes to inﬁnity, we ﬁnd here the standard properties of
the Hotelling model. Indeed, in that case both a and b go to inﬁnity and the
best response against t =0is zero . If t<0, there is no best response: ﬁrm B
would like to stick to ﬁrm A, but slightly on the right hand side. Ideally, ﬁrm
B would like to choose a position t + ε,w i t hε > 0 as small as possible.
5 Characterization of Nash equilibria
Theorem 1 characterizes all Nash equilibria in which both ﬁrms play pure strate-
gies.
Theorem 1
This games always has (at least) one equilibrium in pure strategies.
The shape of the set of Nash equilibria depends on the value of the ratio
δ




the set of Nash equilibria, depending on the
ratio δ
2/σ2.
Case 1. If δ
2/σ2 ≤ 1
4 ln(2),
(tA,t B) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if:
either tA ∈ [−2δ,0] and tB = tA +2 δ,
or tA ∈ [0,+2δ] and tB = tA − 2δ.
Case 2a. If 1
4 ln(2) < δ
2/σ2 ≤ 1
2 ln(2),
(tA,t B) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if:
either tA ∈ [−2δ + a,−a] and tB = tA +2 δ,




2 − σ2 ln(2)
2δ
∈ ]0,δ].
Case 2b. If 1
2 ln(2) ≤ δ
2/σ2 < 2ln(2),
(tA,t B) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if:
either tA = −
³p
2σ2 ln(2) − δ
´
and tB = −tA,
or tA =
p
2σ2 ln(2) − δ and tB = −tA, where.
p
2σ2 ln(2) − δ ∈ [0,δ[
Case 3. If δ
2/σ2 ≥ 2ln(2),
(tA,t B)=( 0 ,0) is the unique Nash equilibrium.





































8Case 1. There is a continuum of Nash equilibria. In all these equilibria, the
ﬁrms are located on opposite sides from the central position, always at distance
2δ one from the other, meaning that the attraction zones do not intersect. These
may be called situations of ”maximal diﬀerentiation”. The two ﬁrms generally
get diﬀerent payoﬀs, the ﬁrm closer to the central modal position attracting
more consumers than its competitor. The only symmetric situations are the
situations in which one ﬁrm chooses location t = −δ and the other ﬁrm location
t =+ δ.
Note that in that case, the “minimal diﬀerentiation principle” does not hold.
The situation in which the two ﬁrms propose the median location (tA = tB =0 )
is not an equilibrium. When one ﬁrm proposes t =0 , the best that the other ﬁrm
can do is to move either to the left or to the right of its competitor, far enough so
that the two attraction zones do not intersect. The mass of consumers located
at the modal central position is not suﬃcient to trigger direct confrontation.
Case 2a. Equilibria in that case are a subset of equilibria in case 1. In
all equilibria, the two ﬁrms are still at distance 2δ one from the other, and on
opposite sides from the central position. The diﬀerence with case 1 is that no
ﬁrm can be within distance a of the central location.
As in case 1, payoﬀso ft h et w oﬁrms are generally diﬀerent, the only sym-
metric situations are the situations in which one ﬁrm proposes t = −δ and the
other ﬁrm oﬀers t =+ δ.
The “minimal diﬀerentiation principle” still does not hold in that case.
Case 2b. There is a unique Nash equilibrium, in which the two ﬁrms
engage in “intermediate diﬀerentiation”. The diﬀerentiation is intermediate in
the sense that ﬁrms do not converge to the same position, while at the same
time having there attraction zones intersect: some consumers, in particular the
median consumer, are located within acceptable distance of the two ﬁrms. In
that situation, both ﬁrms get exactly the same payoﬀ.
Case 3. There is a unique Nash equilibrium, at which both ﬁrms converge
to the central modal position. In that case, we ﬁnd the “minimal diﬀerentiation
principle” to hold.
The proof of Theorem 1 is given in the appendix in sub-section 7.2.
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, I study Hotelling’s spatial competition between two ﬁrms, with
a slight generalization of Hotelling’s assumptions. Rather than assuming that
consumers are ready to buy one unit of the good, whatever the location of the
ﬁrms are, I assume that there is an upper limit (possibly inﬁnite) to the distance
a consumer is ready to cover to buy the good.
What may seem an innocuous change in the assumptions dramatically alters





































8not hold in general in that case, ﬁrms engaging in intermediate or complete
diﬀerentiation. Other papers in the literature have already demonstrated that
ﬁrms’ diﬀerentiation was to be expected — be it maximal or intermediate — see
for example d’Aspremont et al. (1979) or Economides (1986). In these papers,
product diﬀerentiation is the result of two opposite forces: a direct demand
eﬀect that drives the ﬁrms to locate near the center where the demand is and
an indirect strategic eﬀect that drives the ﬁrms to diﬀerentiate in order to soften
price competition.
In the present paper, another motive for diﬀerentiation is put forward, which
is also a direct demand eﬀect, created by the assumption that a consumer may
choose not to buy if the two ﬁrms are too far away from his location. Indeed,
suppose that a ﬁrm has chosen the modal position. If its opponent also selects
this central position, they will share exactly the same attraction zone and thus
each will attract one half of the consumers who are located within acceptable
distance of the central position. When the market is covered whatever the
locations of the ﬁrms (Hotellin’s assumption), each ﬁrm then attracts exactly
one half of the consumers, and may only reduce its market share by moving
either to the left or to the right. This is no more the case when consumers may
choose not to buy the good. The latter ﬁrm may fare better in that case by
avoiding complete competition, and prefer moving somewhat to the left or the
right. In doing so, it will move away from the modal position — thus move away
from the location where the concentration of consumers is the highest — but on
the other hand, it will avoid splitting in two the number of potential consumers.
This latter ”split the pie in two” eﬀect may be strong enough to counterbalance
the force that drives the ﬁrm to the central location, where the demand is.
As noticed in the introduction, the intuition suggests that Hotelling’s con-
vergence result will hold, provided that the distance a consumer is ready to
cover to buy the good is large enough (δ large) or that consumers are suﬃ-
ciently numerous around the center (the standard deviation σ of the assumed
centered normal distribution of consumers is small). Theorem 1 provides a pre-
cise quantiﬁcation for these conditions: The situation where both ﬁrms choose
the central location is an equilibrium if and only if δ
2/σ2 ≥ 2ln(2).N o t et h a t p
2ln(2)is approximately equal to 1.18. This shows that, for the minimal dif-
ferentiation principle to hold, the total length of a ﬁrm’s attraction zone (2δ)
has to be approximately at least as large as 2.35 time the standard deviation
of the distribution of ideal location. This ﬁgure is quite high. By instance,
when δ/σ =
p
2ln(2), the attraction zone of a ﬁrm located at the center covers
over 75% of the population. Theorem 1 also provides conditions for a ”maximal
diﬀerentiation principle” to hold — that is for situations where the two ﬁrms do
not compete for the same consumers. At equilibrium the attraction zones do
not intersect if and only if δ
2/σ2 ≤ 1
2 ln(2).W h e nδ/σ =
p
1/2ln(2) 8,t h ea t -
traction zone of a ﬁrm located at the center covers about 45% of the population.
When a unique ﬁrm located at the central location covers between 45 and 75%
of the market, at equilibrium ﬁrms engage in intermediate diﬀerentiation, the
8p





































8attraction zones of the two ﬁrms only partially intersecting.
7A p p e n d i x
7.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Since the distribution of consumers is symmetric, we can restrict our attention
to studying the best response against any t ≤ 0. The proof of proposition 1
builds on the following three lemmas. Lemma 2 describes the best response of
ﬁrm B against any t by ﬁrm A such that t ≤− 2δ. Lemma 3 describes the best
response of ﬁrm B against any t by ﬁrm A such that −2δ <t<0 and lemma 4
describes the best response of ﬁrm B when ﬁrm A chooses location t =0 .
Lemma 1. Best responses against t ≤− 2δ
If t ≤− 2δ,B R B(t)={0}.
Lemma 2. Best responses against t,f o r−2δ <t<0.
Three cases are to be considered:
• If δ
2/σ2 ≤ 1
4 ln(2), BRB(t)={t +2 δ},
• If 1
4 ln(2) < δ
2/σ2 < 2ln(2),
If t ≤− a, BRB(t)={t +2 δ},
If t ≥− a, BRB(t)={t2(t)},
where a is deﬁned in (1) and t2(.) is deﬁn e di n( 3 ) .
• If δ
2/σ2 ≥ 2ln(2),
If t ≤− a, BRB(t)={t +2 δ},
If −a ≤ t<−b, BRB(t)={t2(t)},w i t ht2(t) <t+2 δ if t>−a,
If t ≥− b, BRB(t)=∅.F i r m B would like to play t + ε, ε > 0 as small as
possible,
where b is deﬁned in (2).
Lemma 3. Best responses against t =0
• If δ
2 ≤ 1
4σ2 ln(2), BRA(0) = {−2δ,2δ}.
• If 1
4σ2 ln(2) < δ
2 < 2σ2 ln(2), BRA(0) = {−t2(0),t 2(0)},w h e r et2(.) is
deﬁned in (3).
• If δ





































8P r o o fo fl e m m a1 .
The proof of lemma 1 is straightforward. When ﬁrm A chooses a location
tA such that tA ≤− 2δ,i fﬁrm B chooses the central modal position t =0 ,t h e
two attraction zones do not intersect and ﬁrm B obtains the maximum possible
payoﬀ: F(δ) − F(−δ). It is obviously the unique best response.
P r o o fo fl e m m a2 .
Note ﬁr s tt h a tw h e n−2δ <t A < 0, any best response for ﬁrm B against
tA lies in
£
tA,t A +2 δ
¤
.
Indeed, it is straightforward to note that GB(t;tA) is strictly increasing in t
on
¤
−∞,t A − 2δ
¤





best response necessarily lies in the interval
£
tA − 2δ,t A +2 δ
¤
.
Thus it remains to be shown that no best response lies in
£
tA − 2δ,t A£
.
This is easily done by checking that if t ∈
£
tA − 2δ,t A£
,t h e nGB(2tA −t;tA) >
GB(t;tA),w h e r e2tA−t is the symmetric of t relative to tA and lies in
¤
tA,t A +2 δ
¤
.
Informally, when selecting t in
£
tA − 2δ,t A£
, ﬁrm B attracts all consumers lo-
c a t e di nt h ei n t e r v a l
£




, whereas when selecting location 2tA−t,




2 ,2tA − t + δ
i
.B o t h i n -





+ δ) but the latter is “closer” to the
modal position9, thus contains more consumers.
This preliminary remark allows us to restrict our attention to to the interval £
tA,t A +2 δ
¤
. By remark 1, we also know that, since tA < 0, t = tA is not a
best response for ﬁrm B against location tA by ﬁrm A. So if ﬁrm B has a best
response against tA, it necessarily lies in the interval
¤
tA,t A +2 δ
¤
and it is the
value of t that maximizes GB on this interval.
For t ∈
¤
tA,t A +2 δ
¤
, GB(t;tA)=F(t + δ) − F(1
2(t + tA)) and
for t ∈
¤
tA,t A +2 δ
£
, ∂GB(t;tA)/∂t = f(t + δ) − 1
2f(1
2(t + tA)),w h e r ef is the








Some elementary algebra show that the derivative of GB with respect to t is
non negative if and only if 3t2 +2 ( 4 δ − tA)t +( 4 δ














tA − 4δ − 2
q
(tA − δ)
2 +6 σ2 ln(2)
¶
9Meaning that the distance between the middle of the interval and location zero











tA +3 t − 2δ
¤














7tA − 3t +2 δ
¤









tA +3 t − 2δ
¤¯ ¯. Now, it
is straightforward to see that 1
4
£
tA +3 t − 2δ
¤
< 0 and 1
4
£











7tA − 3t +2 δ
¤
< 0, this inequality necessarily holds. If 1
4
£
7tA − 3t +2 δ
¤
> 0,o n e
can check that 1
4
£





tA +3 t − 2δ
¤











































tA − 4δ +2
q
(tA − δ)
2 +6 σ2 ln(2)
¶
.
Remember we restrict our search for best responses to the interval
¤
tA,t A +2 δ
¤
.






,r e l a t i v et otA and
tA +2 δ. One can easily check that t1
¡
tA¢
<t A. Besides, some elementary
algebra show that t2
¡
tA¢
≤ tA ⇔ tA ≥− b,a n dt2
¡
tA¢
≤ tA +2 δ ⇔ tA ≥− a,
where a and b are respectively deﬁned in (1) and (2). Note that b<a .
To sum up the results so far:
• if tA ≤− a, t1(tA) <t A <t A +2 δ ≤ t2(tA) and thus GB(t;tA) is strictly
increasing in t on
¤
tA,t A +2 δ
¤
.I nt h a tc a s e ,GB reaches its maximum in
t on the interval
¤
tA,t A +2 δ
¤
in t = tA +2 δ.
• if −a ≤ tA < −b, t1(tA) <t A ≤ t2(tA) ≤ tA +2 δ and thus GB(t;tA) is






t2(tA),t A +2 δ
£
.I nt h a t
case, GB reaches its maximum in t on the interval
¤
tA,t A +2 δ
¤
in t =
t2(tA).( N o t et h a tt2(tA)=tA +2 δ for tA = −a).
• if tA ≥− b, t1(tA) <t 2(tA) ≤ tA <t A+2δ and thus GB(t;tA) is decreasing
in t on
¤
tA,t A +2 δ
¤
.I nt h a tc a s e ,GB has no well deﬁned maximum in t
on the interval
¤
tA,t A +2 δ
¤
.
Now, remember we focus on the case tA ∈ ]−2δ,0[. Therefore we now need to
determine the positions of −a, −b,r e l a t i v et o−2δ and 0. One can easily check
that both −a and −b are strictly greater than −2δ,w i t h−a<−b.B e s i d e s ,
b ≥ 0 ⇔ δ
2/σ2 ≥ 2ln(2)and a ≥ 0 ⇔ δ
2/σ2 ≥ 1
4 ln(2).
Collecting all these results, one can conclude that:
• If δ
2/σ2 ≤ 1
4 ln(2), −2δ < 0 ≤− a<−b.I n t h a t c a s e , tA ≤− a and
therefore, the best response against tA is tA +2 δ.
• If 1
4 ln(2) < δ
2/σ2 < 2ln(2), −2δ < −a<0 < −b.I n t h a t c a s e , i f
tA ≤− a, the best response against tA is tA + δ.; if tA ≥− a,t h eb e s t
response against tA is t2(tA). Note that t2
¡
tA¢
<t A +2 δ if tA > −a.
• If δ
2/σ2 ≥ 2ln(2), −2δ < −a<−b ≤ 0.I n t h a t c a s e , i f tA ≤− a,t h e
best response against tA is tA + δ.I f −a ≤ tA < −b, the best response
against tA is t2(tA).N o t e t h a t t2
¡
tA¢
<t A +2 δ if −a<t A < −b.I f
tA ≥− b, GB(t;tA) is decreasing in t on
¤
tA,t A +2 δ
¤
. But by remark 1,
when tA < 0, Lim
t→tA
t>tA
GB(t;tA) >G B(tA;tA).Thus ﬁrm B would like to play






































8This concludes the proof of lemma 2.
P r o o fo fl e m m a3 .
Given the symmetry of the distribution of consumers’ locations, when ﬁrm
A chooses the location tA =0 , ﬁrm B attracts exactly the same number of
consumers by playing opposite policies t or −t: ∀t ∈R, GB (t;0)=GB (−t;0).
We can therefore restrict our study of GB (t;0) to the non-negative value of
t and look for the best response (best responses) on R+.N o t e ﬁrst that the
pay-oﬀ function GA (t;0)is decreasing in t on the interval [2δ,+∞[. Therefore
any best response lies in the interval [0,2δ].
A straightforward adaptation of the proof of lemma 3 for tA =0allows to
get the following results for tA =0 :
• If δ
2/σ2 ≤ 1
4 ln(2), GB(t;0) is increasing in t on [0,2δ]. Therefore, the
best non-negative response against tA =0is +2δ.
• If 1
4 ln(2) < δ
2/σ2 < 2ln(2), the best non negative response against tA =0
is t2(0) with t2 (0) < 2δ.
• If δ
2/σ2 ≥ 2ln(2), GB(t;0) is continuous and decreasing in t on [0,2δ].
Therefore the best non negative response against 0 is 0.
This completes the proof of lemma 3.
7.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Given the symmetry of the game, we can restrict our attention to studying the
existence of Nash equilibria where tA ≤ 0.




We explore in turn the existence and characterization of Nash equilibria
(tA,t B) where (a) tA ≤− 2δ, (b) −2δ <t A < 0, (c) tA =0 .
(a) Suppose that (tA,t B) is a Nash equilibrium where tA ≤− 2δ.T h e n
it must be the case by proposition 1 (case 1) that tB =0 . But now the best
response of ﬁrm A against 0 is either −2δ or +2δ. Therefore, (tA,t B)=( −2δ,0)
is a Nash equilibrium, and it is the unique Nash equilibrium where tA ≤− 2δ.
(b) Suppose now that (tA,t B) is a Nash equilibrium where −2δ <t A < 0.
The best response of ﬁrm B against tA is tA +2 δ (see proposition 1 case 1).





































8Now the best response against any tB in this interval is tB−2δ. This shows that
all pairs (tA,t A +2 δ) where tA ∈ ]−2δ,0[ are Nash equilibria, and that these
are the only Nash equilibria where A selects a location in the interval ]−2δ,0[.
(c) Suppose now that there is a Nash equilibrium with tA =0 .T h e b e s t
response of ﬁrm B against tA =0is is either 2δ or −2δ. Then it must be
the case that tB ∈ {−2δ,2δ}. But the best response against tB ∈ {−2δ,2δ}
is 0. This shows that the pairs (0,−2δ) and (0,+2δ) are both Nash equilibria,
and that these are the only Nash equilibria where A selects the central position
tA =0 .
Case 2: 1
4 ln(2) < δ
2/σ2 < 2ln(2)
We explore in turn the existence and characterization of Nash equilibria
(tA,t B) wherer (a) tA ≤− 2δ, (b) −2δ <t A ≤− a, (c) −a<t A < 0, (d)
tA =0 .
(a) Suppose that (tA,t B) is a Nash equilibrium where tA ≤− 2δ.T h e n i t
m u s tb et h ec a s eb yp r o p o s i t i o n1t h a ttB =0 . But now the best response of
ﬁrm A against 0 is either −t2(0) or t2(0). Since by remark 2, 0 <t 2(0) < 2δ,t h i s
is a contradiction with tA ≤− 2δ.T h u s ,t h e r ei sn oN a s h(tA,t B) equilibrium
where tA ≤− 2δ.
(b) Suppose now that (tA,t B) is a Nash equilibrium where −2δ <t A ≤− a.
The best response of ﬁrm B against tA is tA +2 δ. Then it must be the case
that tB = tA +2 δ, which lies in the interval ]0,−a +2 δ].
If 0 <t A+2δ <a , by proposition 1, the best response of ﬁrm A against such a
location by ﬁrm B is −t2(−(tA+2δ)). Since 0 <t A+2δ <a ,−a<−(tA+2δ) < 0
and t2(−(tA +2 δ)) < −tA (see remark 2). Therefore −t2(−(tA +2 δ)) >t A,
which contradicts the fact that (tA,t B) is a Nash equilibrium.
Now, if a ≤ tA +2 δ ≤− a +2 δ, the only best response of ﬁrm A against
tA +2δ is tA. Therefore (tA,t B) is a Nash equilibrium where −2δ <t A ≤− a if
and only if tB = tA +2 δ and a − 2δ ≤ tA ≤ 0. The intersection of the intervals
[−2δ,−a] and [a − 2δ,0] is empty when a>δ and is the interval [a − 2δ,−a]
when a ≤ δ.
The condition a ≤ δ also writes 2δ
2 ≤ σ2 ln2.T h u s ,i f2δ
2 > σ2 ln2,t h e r e
is no Nash equilibrium where −2δ <t A ≤− a,a n di f2δ
2 ≤ σ2 ln2,a n y(tA,t B)
where tB = tA +2 δ and a − 2δ ≤ tA ≤− a are Nash equilibria, and these are
the only Nash equilibria where −2δ <t A ≤− a.
(c) Suppose now that (tA,t B) is a Nash equilibrium where −a<t A < 0.
The unique best response of ﬁrm B against tA is t2(tA) ∈
¤
0,t A +2 δ
£
⊂ ]0,2δ[.
The best response against t2(tA) is −t2(−t2(tA)) if t2(tA) ≤ a and t2(tA) − 2δ
if t2(tA) ≥ a. Therefore (tA,t B) is a Nash equilibrium where −a<t A < 0 iﬀ





































8Let us ﬁrst show that there is no equilibrium of the latter kind. By remark
2, the function t2 satisﬁes the property that for t ∈ ]−a,0[, t2(t) <t+2 δ.
Therefore there is no tA, −a<t A < 0, such that tA = t2(tA) − 2δ.
Let us now turn to the existence of equilibria of the former kind. (tA,t B)=
(tA,t 2(tA)) is an equilibrium of the former kind iﬀ −a<t A < 0 , tA =
−t2(−t2(tA)) and t2(tA) ≤ a.
Let us consider the equation tA = −t2(−t2(tA)).L e tu sd e ﬁne the function
G : R → R, G(t)=t2(−t2(t))+t. For all t ∈ [−a,0],G 0(t)=t0
2(t)t0
2(−t2(t))−1.
By remark 2, for any t ∈ R, |t0
2(t)| < 1 and |t0
2(−t2(t))| < 1. This shows
that G0(t) > 0 and so G is strictly increasing on R and therefore there is







=0 . Therefore, a necessary and suﬃcient condition for









,a n d−a<δ −
p
2σ2 ln(2) < 0.O n e c a n
easily check that −a<δ −
p
2σ2 ln(2) ⇔ δ
2/σ2 > 1/2ln(2) and it is always
t h ec a s et h a tδ −
p
2σ2 ln(2) < 0. Therefore there is no Nash equilibrium
where −a<t A < 0 when δ
2/σ2 ≤ 1/2ln(2) and there is a unique Nash
equilibrium where −a<t A < 0 when δ








(d) Suppose now that (tA,t B) is a Nash equilibrium where tA =0 .T h e
best response of ﬁrm B against tA is either t2(0) ∈ [0,2δ] or −t2(0).T h e ni t
m u s tb et h ec a s et h a ttB ∈ {−t2(0),t 2(0)}. By symmetry, (0,t 2(0)) is a Nash
equilibrium if and only if (0,−t2(0) is a Nash equilibrium. One can therefore
study the former situation only. The best response against t2(0) ∈ ]0,2δ[ can not
be the central location (see proposition 1), therefore there is no Nash equilibrium




Since 0 is a best response against location at 0 by the opponent ﬁrm, the
situation where both ﬁrms choose the central location is obviously a Nash equi-
librium.
It remains to be shown that this is the unique equilibrium in that case.
Note ﬁrst that since 0 is the unique best response against location at 0 by the
opponent ﬁrm, (tA,t B)=( 0 ,0) is the only Nash equilibrium where tA =0 .W e
w i l lp r o v ei nt u r nt h a t(a) there is no nash equilibrium in which tA ≤− 2δ, (b)
there is no Nash equilibrium in which −2δ <t A < −a, (c) there is no Nash
equilibrium in which −a ≤ tA < −b and (d) there is no Nash equilibrium in
which −b ≤ tA < 0.
(a) Suppose that (tA,t B) is a Nash equilibrium where tA ≤− 2δ.T h e n i t





































8ﬁrm A against 0 is 0, which is a contradiction with tA ≤− 2δ.Thus there is no
Nash (tA,t B) equilibrium where tA ≤− 2δ.
(b) Suppose now that (tA,t B) is a Nash equilibrium where −2δ <t A < −a.
The best response of ﬁrm B against tA is tA +2 δ. Then it must be the case
that tB = tA+2δ, where which lies in the interval ]0,2δ − a[ ⊂ ]0,a[ Since there
is no best response against any t ∈ ]0,b], a necessary condition for (tA,t A +2δ)
to be an equilibrium with −2δ <t A < −a is that tA = −t2(−tA − 2δ).B u t
0 <t A+2δ <aimplies by remark 2 that t2(−tA−2δ) < −tA, which contradicts
tA = −t2(−tA−2δ). This shows that there is no Nash equilibrium (tA,t B) where
−2δ <t A < −a.
(c) Suppose now that (tA,t B) is a Nash equilibrium where −a ≤ tA < −b.
The unique best response of ﬁrm B against tA is t2(tA). Then it must be the
case that tB = t2(tA). B yr e m a r k2 ,t2 is strictly decreasing on the interval
[−a,−b], therefore t2(tA) ∈ ]t2(−b),t 2(−a)] = ]−b,−a +2 δ] ⊂ ]−b,a].T h e
best response against t2(tA) ⊂ ]−b,a] is 0 if t2(tA)=0 , −t2(−t2(tA)) if b<
t2(tA) ≤ a and is not deﬁned otherwise. Therefore a necessary condition for
(tA,t B) to be a Nash equilibrium where −a ≤ tA < −b is that either tB =0or
−t2(−t2(tA)) = tA. Since the best response for ﬁrm A against tB =0is 0,t h e r e
is no equilibrium where −a ≤ tA < −b ≤ 0 and tB =0 . Let us now consider
the equation tA = −t2(−t2(tA)). We have shown above that this equation has
au n i q u es o l u t i o no nR: tA = δ −
p




2σ2 ln(2) ≥ 0. Therefore there is no equilibrium where −a ≤ tA < −b ≤ 0
and tA = −t2(−t2(tA)). This shows that there is no Nash equilibrium where
−a ≤ tA < −b.
(d) Since there is no well deﬁned best response for ﬁrm B against any
location in [−b,0[ by ﬁrm A, there is no Nash equilibrium where −b ≤ tA < 0.
This completes the proof of theorem 1.
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